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The Relationship between Employee 
Involvement and Workplace Dispute 
Resolution
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN
This paper examines the relationship between employee 
involvement programs and workplace dispute resolution using data 
from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) conducted by 
Statistics Canada. The results provide support for a link between 
employee involvement and lower grievance rates in unionized 
workplaces. This link existed for establishments in both the goods 
and service sectors, but the practices involved differed between 
industrial sectors. By contrast, in nonunion workplaces, results 
of the analysis provided support for a link between the adoption 
of employee involvement programs and formal grievance proce-
dures, but not between employee involvement and lower grievance 
rates.
This study uses data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 
to investigate the relationship between employee involvement programs 
and workplace dispute resolution. Debates over the impact of employee 
involvement programs have included contrasting claims as to whether these 
programs either lead to better relations between management and employees 
in the workplace and improved organizational performance, or alternatively 
represent a new form of work intensification that produces greater conflict 
in the workplace and employee dissatisfaction. Workplace dispute resolu-
tion provides a fulcrum upon which many of the questions posed by these 
debates turn. One of the areas where advocates of employee involvement 
programs have claimed their strongest effects is in reducing grievance 
rates and encouraging faster, more informal resolution of grievances to the 
benefit of both organizations and employees (Kochan, Katz and McKersie 
1986; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991). In contrast, critics claim that employee 
involvement programs create new conflicts in the workplace and that use 
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of grievance procedures to protect employee interests is undermined by 
labour-management cooperation (Parker and Slaughter 1988; Godard and 
Delaney 2000). This study investigates these contrasting claims using data 
from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) conducted by Statistics 
Canada. The WES provides a useful dataset to examine these questions by 
providing workplace level data on grievance procedures and activity from a 
large number of organizations with varying degrees and types of employee 
involvement practices in the workplace.
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
In research investigating the transformation of industrial relations at 
the workplace level, high grievance rates were seen as one of the key char-
acteristics of traditional adversarial patterns of relations in the workplace 
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986). Conversely, lower grievance rates 
and faster, more informal resolution of disputes were identified as part of 
transformed systems or patterns of industrial relations that were associated 
with improved organizational performance (Katz, Kochan and Weber 1985; 
Ichniowski 1986; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991). If lower grievance rates are 
part of such transformed patterns of industrial relations, then we would 
expect grievance rates to vary in conjunction with other practices and 
behaviours that form part of these workplace industrial relations systems 
(Katz, Kochan and Weber 1985; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986).
There are three different ways in which high involvement work systems 
may lead to lower rates of usage of dispute resolution procedures. First, 
greater trust and cooperation between employees and management under 
high involvement work systems may lead to a reduction in the overall 
level of conflict in the workplace (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). 
This conflict reduction effect should reduce the number of underlying 
disputes in the workplace and thereby also reduce the overall rate of usage 
of dispute resolution procedures. Second, there may be an impact of high 
involvement work systems on how disputes are resolved in the work-
place. To the degree that workers are able to resolve more problems and 
disputes informally through these other structures for participation in the 
workplace, we would expect usage of dispute resolution procedures to be 
reduced (Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991). This informal resolution effect would 
predict a reduction in rates of usage of dispute resolution procedures even 
if the level of underlying conflict is not affected. Finally, the involvement 
of employees in decision-making in team-based production systems and 
greater labour-management trust resulting from these systems may also 
produce an effect in which decisions are seen as having greater legitimacy 
to employees. This legitimization effect would also lead to a prediction 
of a reduction in  grievance rates under high performance work systems, 
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apart from any effect on the underlying level of conflict in the workplace 
(Colvin 2003b).
Why should these effects of employee involvement on workplace 
dispute resolution matter for organizations? One direct effect on organi-
zations comes from what Katz, Kochan, and Weber (1985) described as 
the displacement effect of grievance handling. This is the simple insight 
that the greater the time devoted by managers and employees to grievance 
 handling, the less will be the time devoted to more productive activities in 
the workplace. Two more indirect effects are suggested by exit-voice theory 
and organization justice theory. As applied to the employment context, 
exit-voice theory suggests that when confronted with problems in the work-
place, if employees are able to use ‘voice’ mechanisms such as grievance 
procedures to resolve problems, they are less likely to try to use the ‘exit’ 
mechanism of quitting to resolve the problem (Freeman and Medoff 1984). 
More effective voice mechanisms can benefit organizational performance 
by reducing costly turnover, which is likely to be especially important 
under high involvement work systems where the reliance on employee 
commitment and extensive training makes the organization more vulnerable 
to high turnover rates (Shaw et al. 1998; Batt, Colvin and Keefe 2002). 
Organizational justice theory suggests that effective voice mechanisms can 
also benefit organizations by helping induce high levels of job satisfaction 
and organizational commitment among the workforce (Sheppard, Lewicki 
and Minton 1992; Folger and Cropanzano 1998). Experimental research 
results indicate that access to a grievance system enhances the organization 
commitment of employees (Olson-Buchanan 1996).
Obtaining these positive organizational effects depends on the degree 
to which employee involvement actually produces the predicted improve-
ments in workplace dispute resolution. Some have argued that, in fact, 
employee involvement programs may have the contrary effect of leading 
to greater conflict in the workplace and of undermining the effectiveness 
of traditional employee interest representation through structures such as 
grievance procedures (Godard and Delaney 2000). Among the criticisms 
of employee involvement programs is that they involve an intensification 
of work in which teams effectively serve as mechanisms for workers to 
become their own Tayloristic managers, developing new ways to maximize 
the pace of work (Parker and Slaughter 1988). Another line of criticism of 
work teams suggests that there is a disciplining effect of teams in which 
teams establish and monitor norms of behaviour and work performance 
(Barker 1993). If teams do serve this function of disciplining deviations from 
behavioural norms by team members, then it may be that implementation 
of self-managed work teams will lead to an increase in grievances resulting 
from intra-team conflicts.
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Another possibility is that the effect of employee involvement may 
depend on the nature of the involvement practices used. From this perspec-
tive, it may be the case that some employee involvement programs involve 
empowerment of workers and reduced workplace conflict, whereas other 
programs are techniques for work intensification that produce heightened 
conflict. For example, Appelbaum and Batt (1994) argue that involvement 
programs in North American can be seen as following two contrasting 
 models. Under the joint team production model, employee involvement 
involves worker empowerment and the use of self-managed teams, and is 
typically developed and implemented in collaboration between unions and 
management. By contrast, under the alternative lean production model, 
employee involvement occurs in a much more management-directed 
 fashion, characteristically using off-line participation groups directed more 
narrowly at improving quality and productivity. Following this analysis, we 
might expect the joint team production model with its self-managed teams to 
lead to a reduction in workplace conflict, whereas the work intensification 
of lean production would lead to an increase in conflict. The key point here 
is that employee involvement may not be a unidirectional construct, but 
rather the effect of involvement can depend on the nature of the program. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate a number of different features of 
employee involvement programs in order to understand their effects on 
workplace conflict.
A complicating factor in understanding the effect of employee involve-
ment on workplace conflict is the major differences that exist between 
dispute resolution in union and nonunion workplaces. In Canada, as in the 
United States, unionized workplaces virtually universally feature multi-
step grievance procedures, generally culminating in binding arbitration. 
Although there have been some innovations, such as expedited arbitration 
and grievance mediation, what is striking about grievance procedures in 
unionized workplaces is the similarity of procedures across workplaces and 
their stability over time (Eaton and Keefe 1999). Given this relative similar-
ity among union grievance procedures, in research on conflict in unionized 
workplaces it is possible to use common measures, such as the grievance 
rate, as a standard basis for comparison of conflict resolution across dif-
ferent workplaces (e.g., Katz, Kochan and Weber 1985; Ichniowski 1986). 
By contrast, when we turn to the nonunionized workplace, we have to 
deal with the added layer of complexity resulting from variation in the 
presence and structure of grievance procedures. In nonunion workplaces, 
introduction of grievance procedures is at the discretion of management, 
who may choose to have no procedure, only a simple informal procedure, 
or to develop a more elaborate formal procedure. Research in the United 
States has found wide variation in both the adoption and structure of non-
union grievance procedures (Feuille and Chachere 1995; Colvin 2003a) 
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and there is no obvious reason to expect an absence of similar variation in 
Canada. This raises the possibility that in the nonunion workplace, employee 
involvement will be related to both the presence and the usage of griev-
ance procedures. In research on the telecommunications industry in the 
United States, Colvin (2003a) found that employee involvement programs 
in the form of self-managed teams were positively related to the presence 
of nonunion grievance procedures, in particular procedures involving peer 
review panels. Subsequent research indicated that among nonunion work-
places with procedures, those that also had self-managed teams had lower 
grievance rates (Colvin 2003b). In that research, employee involvement 
programs had an additional effect in nonunion workplaces on the adoption 
and structure of grievance procedures, but holding the type of procedure 
constant, the effect on usage was similar to that for unionized workplaces. 
Although this study was based on a single industry in the United States, it 
is plausible that the same relationships may also be present for nonunion 
workplaces in Canada.
An additional factor to consider is that much of the research on 
employee involvement has focused on the manufacturing sector. Much 
less is known about the nature and impact of employee involvement in the 
service sector. Although there are not strong a priori reasons for expecting 
specific differences based on industrial sector, it is certainly possible that 
different types of employee involvement programs may be emphasized 
with different effects on the workplace in the service sector compared to 
the manufacturing sector.
In summary, the existing literature and theory suggest contrasting 
hypotheses that will be tested in this study. If advocates of employee 
involvement are correct, we would expect to find employee involvement 
programs to be associated with lower levels of workplace conflict. By 
contrast, if critics of employee involvement are correct, we would expect 
to find employee involvement programs to be associated with higher levels 
of workplace conflict. Alternatively, if those emphasizing variation in the 
nature of employee involvement are correct, then we would expect the 
direction of the relationship with workplace conflict to depend on the type 
of employment involvement program, with joint team based programs being 
associated with reduced conflict and more individualized lean production 
approaches being associated with higher conflict levels. Finally, given the 
variation in the incidence and structure of grievance procedures in nonunion 
workplaces, if the predictions of advocates of employee involvement are 
correct, we would expect to find in nonunion workplaces a positive associa-
tion between employee involvement programs and the presence of formal 
grievance procedures as well as lower conflict levels, holding the type of 
procedure constant.
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DATA AND METHODS
This study analyzes data from the 1999 and 2000 samples of the 
Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) conducted by Statistics Canada. 
The WES is a nationally representative survey of establishments in the 
Canadian private sector that parallels similar government sponsored surveys 
conducted in the United Kingdom and Australia, albeit with some differ-
ences in methodology and focus (Godard 2001). A key strength of the WES 
is its breadth of coverage, including all industries except farming, fishing, 
trapping, and the public sector. An additional strength of the WES is its very 
high response rate, with over 95% of establishments responding in both 1999 
and 2000 (96.5% and 95.8% respectively). Although the WES is designed 
to provide a broad set of information about the workplace, rather than for 
the testing of specific hypotheses (Godard 2001), it contains a number of 
questions on employee involvement practices and workplace grievance 
procedures relevant to the issues being examined in this study.
The sample for analytical purposes was restricted to establishments 
responding to the survey in both 1999 and 2000. Some questions in the 
WES are only asked every second year, in this case in the 1999 version 
of the survey, whereas others are asked each year. As described below, 
some variables are constructed based on the two-year responses, whereas 
others, generally structural or policy characteristics of the workplaces, are 
based on the 1999 responses. For analytical purposes, I also restricted the 
sample to establishments with at least 20 employees. The reason for doing 
this is to reduce the influence of high variability in annual grievance rates 
in small establishments arising from the small denominator in the equation 
for the grievance rate. For example, one additional grievance in a year in a 
workplace of only five employees would produce a seemingly very large 
20 percentage point jump in the grievance rate.
The primary respondent for the employer portion of the WES is the 
human resource manager for large establishments and the owner/manager 
for small establishments. The survey was administered by a computer-
assisted telephone interview. Although the WES is a particularly care-
fully designed and administered survey, it is worth noting that these are 
self-reported measures collected from individual managers with resulting 
potential biases.
Dependent Variables. The primary dependent variable of interest in 
this study is the annual grievance rate in the establishment. For purposes 
of analysis, the grievance rate is measured as the natural log of the annual 
number of grievances per 100 employees for both union and nonunion 
establishments. I constructed a two-year average grievance rate using the 
reported grievances from 1999 and 2000. The advantage of using a two-year 
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time period to create an average annual grievance rate is that it reduces the 
influence of short-term fluctuations in grievance rates. The logged form is 
used to normalize the distribution of the dependent variable for analysis. 
The grievance rate here measures only the total number of grievances filed, 
not the level or speed of settlement. It may be that there are additional or 
even stronger relationships between employee involvement and the level 
or speed of settlement (see Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991); however, the WES 
establishment level survey does not provide this data. A second dependent 
variable of interest for nonunion establishments is the presence of a formal 
grievance procedure. As noted earlier, whereas formal grievance procedures 
are virtually universal in unionized workplaces, many nonunion workplaces 
lack formal grievance procedures. As a consequence, a preliminary ques-
tion to be examined for nonunion workplaces is whether or not they have 
a formal grievance procedure, which is measured by a simple dichotomous 
variable representing whether (1 = yes) or not (0 = no) the establishment 
has a formal grievance procedure. This question was only asked on the 
1999 version of the WES, not on the 2000 survey, so the variable captures 
the responses in 1999.
Independent Variables. Three variables measure the presence of dif-
ferent types of employee involvement programs in the workplace, each 
captured by a single dichotomous variable indicating the presence (1 = yes) 
or absence (0 = no) of the program. These questions were only asked in 1999 
and the variables are constructed from these responses. The survey questions 
included an extended description of each type of program for respondents. 
The first measures whether or not the workplace has self-managed teams 
(Description in survey: “Self-directed work groups. Semi-autonomous work 
groups or mini-enterprise work groups that have a high level of responsibil-
ity for a wide range of decisions/issues.”). The second measures whether 
or not the workplace has problem solving groups (Description in survey: 
“Problem-solving teams. Responsibilities of teams are limited to specific 
areas such as quality or work flow.”). The third measures whether or not 
the workplace has a job rotation program (Description in survey: “Flexible 
job design. Includes job rotation, job enrichment/redesign (broadened 
job definitions), job enrichment (increased skills, variety or autonomy of 
work).”). Although this last practice does not represent direct employee 
involvement, it is a practice that has been associated in past research with 
the general set of high involvement or high performance work practices. It is 
included here for consistency with past research in this area (e.g., Osterman 
1994, 2000). Next, a simple high involvement work organization (HIWO) 
additive index sums the responses to these three questions to capture the 
overall incidence of employee involvement practices, following a similar 
approach by Osterman (1994, 2000).
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Whereas the first four independent variables capture the simple pres-
ence or absence of programs, they do not indicate the intensity with which 
employee involvement is used in the workplace. Two additional variables 
provided a measure of the degree to which employees are involved in 
decision-making in the workplace. The first of these variables captures 
individual employee involvement through a four-item scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.790) measuring the degree to which individual employees make 
decisions with respect to: daily planning of individual work; weekly plan-
ning of individual work; follow-up results; quality control; purchase of nec-
essary supplies; and maintenance of machinery and equipment. The second 
of these variables captures workgroup involvement through a four-item scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.795) measuring the degree to which work groups 
make decisions with respect to: daily planning of individual work; weekly 
planning of individual work; follow-up results; quality control; purchase of 
necessary supplies; and maintenance of machinery and equipment.
Three variables capture human resource (HR) practices supportive of 
employee involvement. Team training measures whether or not (1 = yes, 
0 = no), the establishment provided its employees in 1999 or 2000 with 
classroom or on-the-job training in either “group decision-making or prob-
lem-solving” or “team-building, leadership, communication”. Gainsharing 
measures whether or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) the establishment’s compensa-
tion system in 1999 had a gainsharing program, which rewards employees 
based on “group output or performance”. Profitsharing measures whether 
or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) the establishment’s compensation system in 1999 
had a profit sharing plan.
Additional independent variables were included to account for work-
place characteristics likely to affect grievance rates. Workforce size was 
measured in hundreds of people employed at the location, calculated as a 
two-year average for 1999 and 2000. Workforce stability was measured by 
the proportion full-time and permanent of the workforce (e.g., if 75% of the 
workforce is full-time and permanent, the proportion full-time and perma-
nent is 0.75). A dichotomous variable (1 = yes, 0 = no) captured whether 
there was one or more specialized human resource (HR) personnel in the 
workplace, measured in 1999. Average pay of employees was measured 
in thousands of dollars, constructed as a two-year average for 1999 and 
2000. A single dichotomous variable captured whether the establishment 
was in the service sector or in the goods/manufacturing sector (1 = service 
sector, 0 = goods sector).
Two variables were included to control for grievance procedure 
characteristics that might affect grievance rates: whether the procedure 
included a labour-management committee (1 = yes, 0 = no); and whether 
the procedure included an outside arbitrator (1 = yes, 0 = no). Although 
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the WES uses the common term “labour-management committee” in the 
question for both unionized and nonunion establishments, it is worth noting 
that this term may capture somewhat different types of procedures in these 
two contexts. In the unionized context, there may simply be a labour-man-
agement committee that jointly addresses grievance issues. By contrast, in 
the nonunion context, this question may be capturing the presence of peer 
review procedures, where both managers and employees who are peers of 
the grievant sit on a panel that decides grievances. Peer review procedures 
are used by a number of companies in the United States (Colvin 2003a, 
2003b), but little is known about their presence or use in Canada. Finally, 
two variables were included to capture episodes of industrial conflict that 
often lead to temporary upsurges in grievance rates in unionized workplaces: 
whether the establishment had a strike or lockout in 1999 or 2000 (1 = yes, 
0 = no); and whether the establishment had some type of other work action, 
including work-to-rule, work slowdowns and other labour actions, in 1999 
or 2000 (1 = yes, 0 = no).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for the variables are reported in Table 1. Means 
and standard deviations are reported separately for union and nonunion 
establishments. As expected, average annual grievance rates are much 
higher in unionized establishments, 7.64 per hundred employees, than 
in nonunion establishments, 1.50 per hundred establishments. Overall, 
employee involvement programs are more common in nonunion than in 
unionized establishments. However, it is interesting to note that individual 
employee involvement in decision-making is higher in unionized establish-
ments than in nonunion establishments.
Estimation equations for the dependent variables are reported in Tables 
2-4. The first dependent variable, the logged grievance rate, has a distri-
bution that is approximately normal (after the log transformation), but is 
truncated below at zero since grievance rates cannot be less than zero. As 
a result, tobit regressions are used for estimating this variable. The second 
dependent variable estimated, the presence of a formal grievance procedure 
in nonunion establishments, is dichotomous (1-0). Logit regressions are 
used for estimating this variable. All regressions are weighted based on the 
sampling design of the WES survey. Estimations for the grievance rate are 
conducted separately for nonunion and unionized establishments, given that 
the institutional structure and role of the grievance procedure in unionized 
workplaces may produce different dynamics and predictors of grievance 
rates than is the case in nonunion workplaces. In addition, separate regres-
sions are estimated for unionized establishments in the goods and service 
sectors to see if relationships differed by industrial sector.
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TABLE 1
Means and S.D. for Grievance Rate Estimation Sub-Samples of Union and 
Nonunion Establishments with Formal Grievance Procedures
Variable Unionized
Establishments
Nonunion
Establishments
Mean
(% yes)
S.D. Mean
(% yes)
S.D.
Average pay ($’000s) 35.972 19.501 30.435 17.194
Proportion full-time and permanent (0-1)  0.755 0.268  0.723  0.297
Workforce size (’00s) 1.47 2.93 0.81  1.63
Service sector (yes = 1, no = 0) 67.6% 80.0%
Strike or lockout (yes = 1, no = 0)  2.8% n.a.
Other work action (yes = 1, no = 0)  5.7% n.a.
HR practices supporting EI:
Team training (yes = 1, no = 0) 52.2% 76.3%
Gainsharing (yes = 1, no = 0) 21.6% 32.2%
Profitsharing (yes = 1, no = 0) 17.9% 23.0%
Employee involvement programs:
Self-directed teams (yes = 1, no = 0) 10.7% 22.4%
Problem solving groups (yes = 1, no = 0) 35.0% 43.7%
Job rotation (yes = 1, no = 0) 54.6% 75.7%
HIWO additive index (0-3)  1.002  0.970  1.418  1.001
Involvement in decision-making:
Individual employee involvement (0-6)  1.732  1.935  1.420  1.591
Workgroup involvement (0-6)  0.548  1.044  0.742  1.197
Grievance procedures:
Labour-management committee (yes = 1, 
no = 0)
13.6%  9.7%
Outside arbitrator (yes = 1, no = 0) 60.3%  5.2%
Grievance rate (annual per 100 e’ees)  7.638 21.757  1.503  9.448
Note: For dichotomous (yes = 1, no = 0) variables, the percentage of yes 
responses is reported under the “mean” column.
Results for three prediction equations for grievance rates for union-
ized establishments are reported in Table 2. In the first equation, employee 
involvement is represented by the three variables representing different 
types of employee involvement programs, i.e. self-directed teams, problem 
solving groups, and job rotation. Among the three types of EI program, 
problem solving groups have a statistically significant (p < .05) negative 
association with grievance rates. The coefficients for both self-directed 
teams and job rotation are negative, but neither is statistically significant. 
In the second equation, employee involvement is represented by the HIWO 
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TABLE 2
Predictors of Grievance Rates: Unionized Establishments
Tobit estimates for Natural Log of Annual Grievances per 100 employees
(1) (2) (3)
Average pay –0.009***) –0.009***) –0.008***)
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)***
Proportion full-time and permanent 0.808***) 0.798***) 1.061***)
(0.186)*** (0.186)*** (0.193)***
Workforce size 0.015***) 0.014***) 0.008***)
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Service sector –0.083***) –0.080***) 0.007***)
(0.097)*** (0.097)*** (0.099)***
Strike or lockout 0.561***) 0.540***) 0.531***)
(0.232)*** (0.231)*** (0.232)***
Other work action 0.895***) 0.897***) 0.840***)
(0.165)*** (0.165)*** (0.165)***
Labour-management committee –0.024***) –0.052***) –0.307***)
(0.158)*** (0.156)*** (0.162)***
Outside arbitrator 0.194***) 0.186***) 0.067***)
(0.108)*** (0.108)*** (0.115)***
HR practices supporting EI:
Team training 0.477***) 0.462***) 0.426***)
(0.097)*** (0.096)*** (0.092)***
Gainsharing 0.101)*** 0.127***) 0.061***)
(0.109)*** (0.106)*** (0.109)***
Profitsharing –0.071)*** –0.068***) –0.126***)
(0.105)*** (0.105)*** (0.107)***
Employee involvement programs:
Self-directed teams –0.132)***
(0.141)***
Problem solving groups –0.262***)
(0.104)***
Job rotation –0.085***)
(0.096)***
HIWO additive index –1.64*** )
(0.046)***
Involvement in decision-making:
Individual employee involvement 0.070***)
(0.041)***
Workgroup involvement –0.099***)
(0.025)***
Constant 0.574***) 0.598***) 0.508***)
(0.206)*** (0.204)*** (0.211)***
Model Chi-Sq 103.75*** 102.57*** 113.71***
N 1141*** 1141*** 1010***
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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additive index, which also has a statistically significant (p < .001) negative 
association with grievance rates. The results for the first two estimation 
equations provide support for the conflict reducing effect of employee 
involvement. By contrast, the picture is a bit more complicated when we 
look at employee involvement as captured by the individual employee and 
workgroup involvement decision-making indexes. Workgroup involve-
ment in decision-making has a statistically significant (p < .001) negative 
association with grievance rates, in accord with the prediction of a conflict 
reducing effect of employee involvement. However, individual employee 
involvement in decision-making was not significantly associated with 
grievance rates.
There are a few interesting results for other variables in the equations 
in Table 2. As expected, there are statistically significant positive associa-
tions in all three equations between grievance rates and the occurrence of 
strikes or lockouts (p < .05) and other work actions (p < .001). These results 
confirm traditional industrial relations wisdom that unions often use the 
filing of increased numbers of grievances as a technique to put pressure on 
management in conjunction with other types of labour action such as work 
slowdowns, work-to-rule, and strikes. More surprisingly, amongst the HR 
practices thought of as supportive of employee involvement, only team train-
ing has a statistically significant (p < .001) association with grievance rates, 
but in a positive direction rather than the negative direction predicted.
As noted earlier, most of the existing research on employee involvement 
and on grievance procedures has focused on the manufacturing or goods 
sector. To investigate whether there are differences in the relationships 
involved based on industrial sector, separate equations are estimated for the 
goods and service sectors in Table 3. The results suggest that differences 
do exist based on industrial sector. The first and third columns in Table 3 
report estimation equations for unionized establishments, in the goods and 
service sectors respectively, with employee involvement represented by 
the three variables capturing the presence of individual types of programs. 
Whereas in equation one for the goods sector, self-directed teams are the 
only type of program with a statistically significant (p < .001) negative 
association with grievance rates, in equation three for the service sector, 
problem solving groups are the only type of program with a statistically 
significant (p < .001) negative association with grievance rates. There is a 
similar contrast in equations two and four which report estimation equations 
for unionized establishments in the goods and service sectors, respectively, 
with employee involvement captured by the two employee involvement in 
decision-making indexes. In the goods sector, in equation two, individual 
employee involvement in decision-making has a statistically significant 
(p < .01) positive association with grievance rates, whereas workgroup 
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TABLE 3
Predictors of Grievance Rates for Goods and Service Sectors, Union 
Establishments Tobit estimates for Natural Log of Annual Grievances
per 100 employees
Goods sector
(1)
Goods sector
(2)
Service sector
(3)
Service sector
(4)
Average pay 0.001***) –0.001***) –0.023*** ) –0.016***)
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)* ** (0.005)***
Proportion full-time and
 permanent 
1.855***)
(0.326)***
2.232***)
(0.362)***
0.954*** )
(0.283)* **
0.113***)
(0.291)***
Workforce size 0.022***) 0.010***) –0.015** *) –0.009***)
(0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.026) *** (0.026)***
Strike or lockout 0.384***) 0.382***) 0.877** *) 0.916***)
(0.270)*** (0.287)*** (0.360)* ** (0.353)***
Other work action 0.634***) 0.626***) 1.183*** ) 1.206***)
(0.170)*** (0.177)*** (0.290)* ** (0.288)***
Labour-management 
 committee
–0.014***)
(0.199)***
0.069***)
(0.208)***
0.026* **)
(0.240)* **
–0.469***)
(0.255)***
Outside arbitrator 0.136***) 0.183***) 0.180* **) 0.013***)
(0.156)*** (0.166)*** (0.150)* ** (0.158)***
HR practices supporting EI:
Team training 0.624***) 0.563***) 0.351** *) 0.233***)
(0.133)*** (0.129)*** (0.204)** * (0.131)***
Gainsharing 0.523***) 0.499***) –0.125** *) –0.253***)
(0.142)*** (0.145)*** (0.163)* ** (0.163)***
Profitsharing –0.005***) 0.036***) –0.051** *) 0.000***)
(0.136)*** (0.145)*** (0.160) *** (0.160)***
Employee involvement 
programs:
Self-directed teams –0.878***) 0.173** *)
(0.180)*** (0.141)* **
Problem solving groups 0.111***) –0.474*** )
(0.134)*** (0.152) ***
Job rotation 0.094***) –0.191* **)
(0.128)*** (0.140)* **
Involvement in decision-
making:
Individual employee 
 involvement
0.102***)
(0.049)***
0.002***)
(0.683)***
Workgroup involvement –0.001***) –0.145***)
(0.035)*** (0.036)***
Constant –1.054***) 1.370***) 1.040*** ) 1.009***)
(0.348)*** (0.388)*** (0.229)* ** (0.224)***
Model chi-square 128.61***) 111.92***) 67.96*** ) 71.54***)
N 597*** 551*** 544* ** 459***
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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involvement is not significant. By contrast, in the service sector, in equa-
tion four, workgroup involvement in decision-making has a statistically 
significant (p < .001) negative association with grievance rates, whereas 
individual employee involvement is not significant. Overall, these results 
indicate that employee involvement programs are associated with lower 
grievance rates in unionized establishments, but that the type of involve-
ment program that has this effect differs between goods and service sector 
establishments.
Next we turn to the estimation equations for nonunion establishments, 
reported in Table 4. For nonunion establishments, there are two dependent 
variables of interest: first, whether the establishment has a formal griev-
ance procedure; and second, for those nonunion establishments with a 
procedure, the grievance rate. Employee involvement is predicted to be 
associated with the presence of formal grievance procedures, but also with 
lower grievance rates for those establishments with procedures. The first 
two columns in Table 4 report logit regression estimates for the predictors 
of the presence of a formal grievance procedure in nonunion establish-
ments. Supporting the predicted relationship, in the first equation there 
is a statistically significant positive association between the presence of 
formal grievance procedures and both self-directed teams (p < .001) and 
job rotation (p < .001). Having self-directed teams increases the odds of 
also having formal grievance procedures by 101% and having job rotation 
increases the odds of having procedures by 124%. Similarly, there is a 
statistically significant positive association in the second equation between 
the presence of formal grievance procedures and the HIWO additive index 
(p < .001). Among the supportive HR practices, formal grievance procedures 
have statistically significant positive associations with both gainsharing 
(p < .001) and profitsharing (p < .01). Gainsharing increases the odds of 
having a formal grievance procedure by 137% and profitsharing increases 
the odds by 50%. These results provide good support for the prediction 
that formal grievance procedures in nonunion establishments will be more 
likely where the establishments also have employee involvement programs 
and related supporting HR practices.
Results for two estimation equations for grievance rates for nonunion 
establishments with formal procedures are presented in the last two col-
umns of Table 4. The results here did not show evidence of a relationship 
between employee involvement programs and the usage of nonunion griev-
ance procedures. In the third equation in Table 4, none of the three types of 
employee involvement program examined had statistically significant asso-
ciations with grievance rates. Neither of the variables measuring employee 
involvement in decision-making, tested in the fourth equation in Table 4, 
has a statistically significant association with grievance rates for nonunion 
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TABLE 4
Nonunion Establishments: Predictors of Procedure Presence
and Grievance Rates
Procedure 
Presence
(1)
Procedure 
Presence
(2)
Grievance
Rate
(3)
Grievance
Rate
(4)
Average pay 0.006***) 0.006***) –0.014***) –0.011)
(0.004)***
[1.006]***
(0.004)***
[1.006]***
(0.008)*** (0.008)
Proportion full-time and permanent –0.694***) –0.690***) 0.040***) 0.141)
(0.278)***
[0.500]***
(0.275)***
[0.502]***
(0.485)*** (0.493)
Workforce size 0.298***) 0.293***) –0.178***) –0.160)
(0.094)***
[1.347]***
(0.094)***
[1.340]***
(0.075)*** (0.083)
Service sector 0.523***) 0.585***) –0.110***) –0.044)
(0.203)***
[1.687]***
(0.202)***
[1.795]***
(0.301)*** (0.304)
Specialized HR personnel 0.379***) 0.434***)
(0.165)***
[1.461]***
(0.164)***
[1.543]***
Labour-management committee –0.092***) –0.036)
(0.385)*** (0.402)
Outside arbitrator –0.654***) –0.395)
(0.486)*** (0.595)
HR practices supporting EI:
Team training 0.244***) 0.175***) –0.287***) –0.265)
(0.154)***
[1.276]***
(0.153)***
[1.191]***
(0.273)*** (0.267)
Gainsharing 0.865***) 0.857***) 0.161***) –0.040)
(0.157)***
[2.375]***
(0.155)***
[2.356]***
(0.248)*** (0.251)
Profitsharing 0.406***) 0.484***) –0.238***) –0.271)
(0.166)***
[1.501]***
(0.162)***
[1.623]***
(0.256)*** (0.260)
Employee involvement programs:
Self-directed teams 0.698***) 0.460***)
(0.183)***
[2.010]***
(0.277)***
Problem solving groups 0.056***) –0.367***)
(0.160)***
[1.058]***
(0.267)***
Job rotation 0.807***) 0.142***)
(0.162)***
[2.241]***
(0.281)***
HIWO additive index 0.510***)
(0.076)***
[1.665]***
Involvement in decision-making:
Individual employee involvement -0.043)
(0.073)
Workgroup involvement -0.157)
(0.102)
Constant –3.267***) –3.250***) 0.465***) 0.549)
(0.306)*** (0.300)*** (0.518)*** (0.497)
Model Chi-Sq 214.70***) 204.14***) 22.41***) 15.77)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1274***) 0.1211***)
N 2237*** 2237*** 368*** 319
Notes: Models (1) and (2) are logit regressions, models (3) and (4) are tobit regressions; 
for models (1) and (2), odds ratios are in square parentheses; standard errors are in round 
parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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establishments. Similarly, none of the supporting HR practices have sta-
tistically significant associations with grievance rates in either the third or 
fourth equations in Table 4. Overall, whereas there is strong evidence for a 
link between employee involvement and the presence of formal grievance 
procedures in nonunion establishments, there is a lack of evidence for an 
association between employee involvement and usage of these procedures 
for nonunion establishments.
The results for the different measures of employee involvement are 
summarized in Table 5. Looking across the different results, there is rea-
sonably good support in unionized workplaces for a negative relationship 
between grievance rates and employee involvement in the form of self-
directed work teams, problem solving groups, an additive high involvement 
index and greater workgroup autonomy. These relationships are not present 
for grievance rates in nonunion workplaces, but greater employee involve-
ment is associated with a greater likelihood of formal nonunion grievance 
procedures existing in the workplace. Lastly, similar relationships were not 
found for greater individual autonomy in workplace decision-making, sug-
gesting that group level involvement is a key factor in the effects found.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study set out to examine the relationship between employee 
involvement and workplace dispute resolution. Research supporting high 
involvement work systems has suggested that greater employee involvement 
should be associated with reduced workplace conflict and lower grievance 
rates. By contrast, critics of employee involvement have argued that these 
programs often involve the intensification of work, rather than empower-
ment of employees and reduction of conflict. In general, the results of this 
study provide more support for the former view than the latter; however, 
they also suggest that the dynamics involved in the relationship between 
employee involvement and workplace dispute resolution are more complex 
than just a simple, generally applicable effect.
The results found in this study for unionized establishments gener-
ally support a link between employee involvement programs and lower 
grievance rates. Higher involvement practices, as represented by the high 
involvement work practice index, use of problem solving groups, and greater 
workgroup involvement in decision-making, were all found to be associ-
ated with lower grievance rates. These relationships support the predictions 
of advocates of employee involvement, that greater involvement will be 
associated with reduced workplace conflict.
When we break down the results by industrial sector, additional com-
plexity in the relationship between employee involvement and workplace 
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dispute resolution becomes evident. The type of employee involvement 
program that is most important varies by industrial sector. Whereas in the 
goods sector, where most past research has focused, self-directed teams had 
the larger effect, and in the service sector, problem solving groups had the 
greater effect. Research in the manufacturing setting has particularly empha-
sized the significance of self-directed teams as an employee involvement 
mechanism transforming the organization of work. However, the results here 
suggest that in the service sector, problem solving groups may be having a 
bigger impact in the workplace. Similarly, there are differences in the effect 
of different types of employee involvement in decision-making between 
 sectors. Individual involvement in decision-making had an effect in the 
goods sector in increasing grievance rates, perhaps representing the situa-
tion of individualized workplaces in manufacturing. By contrast, workgroup 
rather than individual involvement in decision-making was important in the 
service sector, but in the opposite direction of lower grievance rates, which 
accords with the predictions of advocates of employee involvement.
Further layers of complexity are added to the picture when we turn from 
the more familiar setting of unionized grievance procedures to examine the 
findings for nonunion establishments. Before looking at grievance rates, an 
initial question to be examined for nonunion establishments was whether 
there was an association between the presence of employee involvement 
programs and the presence of formal grievance procedures. Whereas formal 
grievance procedures are virtually universal in unionized workplaces, many 
nonunion workplaces lack any formal procedures for employees to make 
complaints or grievances, or simply rely on informal or ad hoc handling 
of complaints by individual managers. If the hypothesized link between 
employee involvement and more effective workplace dispute resolution is 
true, then we might expect to find establishments that adopted employee 
involvement programs to have also adopted formal procedures to handle 
employee complaints and grievances. The results provided strong support 
for this proposed link, with nonunion workplaces having self-directed teams, 
job rotation, and higher scores on the high involvement additive index also 
being more likely to have adopted formal grievance procedures.
By contrast, when we turn to the usage of nonunion grievance proce-
dures, there is a lack of evidence for a link with the presence of employee 
involvement programs. One explanation for the absence of findings for 
nonunion grievance rates may be that there are two opposing effects at 
work. Employee involvement programs could be exerting a negative effect 
on grievance rates for the reasons described for union procedures. However, 
there may be an opposing effect due to variations in the accessibility of 
nonunion procedures. Past research on nonunion grievance procedures 
has found that employees are more likely to use procedures that have 
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 stronger due process protections, such as procedures with more independent 
 decision-makers (Colvin 2003b). Conversely, research has suggested that 
employees are likely to be discouraged from using procedures for fear of 
subsequent retaliation by supervisors, which appears often to be a well-
founded fear (Boroff and Lewin, 1996; Lewin and Peterson, 1999; Lewin, 
1999). If establishments with employee involvement programs also tend 
to have grievance procedures with stronger due process features and less 
retaliation for using them, then we would expect higher usage rates for 
these procedures. These unobserved characteristics of grievance procedures 
in high involvement workplaces could be producing an increase in griev-
ance rates that offsets the decrease from reduced workplace conflict with 
employee involvement. Although the ability to address this possibility in 
the present study is limited by the data in the WES survey, future research 
could address this possibility by examining in greater detail the nature and 
structure of the nonunion grievance procedures and the dynamics of their 
usage by employees.
Overall, a limitation of this study is the restrictions in the set of ques-
tions posed in the WES survey. Although the WES does provide some 
useful information on grievance procedures and rates, as Godard (2001) 
has noted, it lacks information in certain areas, such as on the texture and 
processes of workplace relations. This may be a limitation inherent in large 
scale, publicly conducted national surveys, requiring supplement by more 
narrowly targeted studies to explore specific issues. At the same time, this 
data does give us a broad picture of what is going on in workplace dispute 
resolution across the Canadian economy, something that has not been avail-
able in the past. It is also worth recognizing that alternative interpretations 
of the reduction in grievance rates associated with employee involvement 
programs in unionized workplaces are possible. A critic of employee 
involvement could argue that the reduction in grievance rates really reflects 
the cooptation of unions and suppression of conflict under management 
driven lean production forms of employee involvement, which individual-
ize employees and reduce the ability of workers to protect their interests 
collectively through using the grievance system. The data examined here 
do not allow a definitive exclusion of this alternative explanation. However, 
future research addressing this question could profitably address this pos-
sibility by examining in greater depth the quality of labour-management 
relations in these workplaces from the perspective of both management 
and workers.
Overall the results of this study indicate a need to move beyond a simple 
picture of a single, universal relationship between employee involvement 
and workplace conflict. The effects of employee involvement depend on the 
type of program that is used, and how and in what context it is implemented. 
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There are important differences between union and nonunion workplaces in 
effects on workplace dispute resolution and between the goods and service 
sectors. Future research needs to recognize and explore these differences. It 
is also important to focus on the implementation of employee involvement 
in terms of how it affects decision-making in the workplace, rather than 
simply on the adoption of procedures. It would be useful, in addition, to 
examining overall grievance rates to look at the nature of the grievances 
being filed. Hopefully this type of future research could help increase our 
understanding of the range of different ways in which employee involve-
ment can affect dispute resolution in the workplace, building on the findings 
that have been reported in this study.
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RÉSUMÉ
La relation entre l’implication des salariés et le règlement des 
mésententes sur les lieux de travail
Cet essai reprend les données de l’Enquête sur le lieu de travail et 
les employés (ELTE) de Statistique Canada pour vérifier la relation entre 
l’implication des salariés et le règlement des mésententes sur les lieux de 
travail. Le règlement des mésententes sur les lieux de travail fournit un 
ancrage à de nombreuses discussions sur l’implication des salariés. Les 
partisans de l’implication des salariés prétendent que ces programmes ont 
des effets bénéfiques sur la diminution des griefs et favorisent une solution 
plus rapide et plus efficace des règlements des conflits. Il existe plusieurs 
manières dont l’implication des salariés peut conduire à une diminution 
des conflits. Un niveau plus élevé de collaboration et de confiance entre 
les salariés et la direction sous l’égide de programmes d’implication peut 
contribuer à la réduction des conflits dans le sens d’une diminution des 
sources de griefs sur les lieux de travail. Un règlement de nature informelle 
peut aussi contribuer à réduire le nombre de griefs si les programmes 
d’implication permettent aux salariés de résoudre plus rapidement les 
problèmes sur une base informelle avant qu’ils se transforment en griefs 
officiels. Enfin, un effet de légitimation peut apparaître si l’implication des 
salariés incite ces derniers à accorder plus de légitimité aux décisions sur 
les lieux de travail et, par conséquent, ces décisions ont moins de valeur de 
contestation dans le cas d’un recours éventuel à la procédure de règlements 
des griefs. À l’opposé, les critiques de l’idée d’implication des salariés 
prétendent que ces programmes contribuent à l’intensification du travail 
et engendrent de nouvelles sources de conflits sur les lieux de travail. De 
plus, les  programmes d’implication présentent des différences en termes de 
structure et d’impact et il peut arriver que l’effet de tels programmes sur 
la solution des conflits dépende de la nature du programme en question et 
du contexte dans lequel il est introduit.
Cet article analyse les données tirées de l’enquête de Statistique Canada 
sur des échantillons d’établissements au cours des années 1999 et 2000. 
Cette recherche est basée sur un échantillon représentatif à l’échelle natio-
nale d’établissements du secteur privé, permettant de vérifier l’impact des 
programmes d’implication sur le règlement des mésententes sur les lieux 
de travail à travers un large éventail d’industries et comprenant des lieux de 
travail syndiqués et également non syndiqués. Étant donné les différences 
importantes entre les procédures de solutions des conflits au passage d’un 
secteur syndiqué à un autre non syndiqué, on a effectué une analyse séparée : 
une pour les établissements non syndiqués, une autre pour ceux syndiqués. 
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Dans le cas de ces derniers, où la procédure formelle de règlement des 
griefs est universellement répandue, la variable clef dépendante comportant 
un intérêt certain était le taux de griefs. Dans le cas des établissements 
non syndiqués, où l’on observe de grandes variations au plan des modes 
de solution des mésententes, la variable dépendante incluait à la fois une 
procédure formelle de règlement et un taux de plaintes.
Les données observées dans le secteur syndiqué viennent confirmer 
la présence d’un effet des programmes d’implication dans le sens d’une 
réduction du taux de griefs. Des notes plus élevées sur un indice cumulatif 
mesurant la présence de programmes d’implication étaient accompagnées 
d’un taux plus faible de griefs. Également, une mesure d’un niveau plus 
élevé d’implication des employés dans la prise de décisions s’accompa-
gnait d’un taux réduit de griefs. Des différences apparaissaient là où les 
données étaient ventilées par secteur industriel. Alors que, dans le secteur 
des biens, des équipes autogérées constituaient le type unique d’implica-
tion des  salariés associées à de faibles taux de griefs, on constatait, dans 
le secteur des services, la présence de groupes de solution de problèmes 
comme l’unique type d’implication associé à un plus faible taux de griefs. 
La plupart des études existantes, s’intéressant à l’implication des salariés, 
renvoient à des travaux de recherche effectués dans le secteur des biens et 
elles font ressortir l’importance des équipes autogérées comme étant le seul 
type de programme comportant l’impact le plus prononcé. Au contraire, 
les conclusions de la présente étude sont à l’effet que, dans le secteur des 
services, les groupes de solution de problèmes ont un impact plus élevé.
Les résultats de la recherche dans le cas des établissements non syn-
diqués présentent une mosaïque variée au plan des effets des programmes 
d’implication. On constate une association assez marquée entre des pro-
grammes d’implication et la présence de procédures formelles de règlement 
de griefs dans les établissements non syndiqués. Des notes plus élevées sur 
l’indice d’implication étaient associées à des probabilités plus élevées de 
recourir à une procédure formelle de règlement. Parmi les types particuliers 
de programmes, ceux de rotation de postes et d’équipes autogérées s’accom-
pagnaient de la présence de procédures formelles de règlement. Cependant, 
en opposition aux conclusions dans le cas des établissements syndiqués, on 
n’observait pas de liens significatifs entre les programmes d’implication et 
le taux de griefs dans les établissements non syndiqués. Une explication de 
ce phénomène est la présence possible d’effets compensateurs à l’œuvre 
dans ces derniers établissements qui influencent le taux de griefs. Si l’effet 
de réduction des conflits observé dans les établissements syndiqués opère 
également dans ceux qui ne sont pas syndiqués, cela va alors contribuer à 
une réduction du taux de griefs. Cependant, il existe aussi un effet opposé 
qui origine dans les différences non constatées au plan de la qualité des 
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procédures dans le secteur non syndiqué. Alors que les procédures de règle-
ment sont relativement standard dans leur composition, qu’elles représentent 
de façon bien caractérisée des preneurs de décisions neutres et qu’elles 
reflètent également une représentation indépendante des employés dans le 
secteur syndiqué, on observe, dans les lieux de travail non syndiqués, que 
la composition des procédures de règlement et la garantie qu’elles offrent à 
l’endroit d’un traitement équitable varient énormément. Les salariés peuvent 
hésiter à recourir à des procédures de règlement dans le secteur non syndiqué 
à cause d’une absence de protection à l’endroit d’un traitement équitable et 
à cause d’éventuelles représailles qui peuvent être exercées contre eux. Si 
les établissements non syndiqués, où l’on retrouve des programmes d’im-
plication, ont des procédures de règlement comportant des garanties plus 
élevées d’un traitement équitable et une protection contre des représailles 
découlant du recours à de telles procédures, cela peut accroître la probabilité 
que les salariés se servent de la procédure lorsqu’un problème se présente 
sur les lieux de travail. Cela peut alors faire en sorte que des programmes 
d’implication puissent produire un effet positif, compensant l’effet négatif 
de réduction de conflits qu’on a décrit plus haut.
Dans l’ensemble, les conclusions de l’étude fournissent un support aux 
arguments de ceux qui se font les défenseurs des programmes d’implica-
tion. Ces derniers s’accompagnent d’un taux plus faible de griefs dans les 
établissements syndiqués et d’une diffusion plus grande des procédures 
 formelles de règlement dans les établissements non syndiqués. Cependant, 
ces  conclusions permettent de constater quelques variations au plan de 
 l’effet des programmes d’implication, à la fois entre les secteurs des biens et 
ceux des services, entre les lieux de travail syndiqués et non syndiqués.
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